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We must study, we must investigate, we must attempt to solve; and the utmost 
that the world can demand is, not lack of human interest and moral conviction, but 
rather the heart-quality of fairness, and an earnest desire for the truth despite its 
possible unpleasantness.  
    --Du Bois, The Philadelphia Negro (1899)
i
 
 
 As attested to by his vast oeuvre of work in various media, there can be no 
denying that W.E.B. Du Bois was relentlessly preoccupied with the “unpleasant 
consequences” of exposing “the truth.” There also can be no denying that Du Bois 
understood the value and power of propaganda, or that he was himself engaged in 
propagandistic practices, willfully if not happily, throughout his long and incomparably 
interesting career as an activist, sociologist, philosopher, journalist, curator, and writer of 
fictional and autobiographical works. In his 1926 address at the NAACP's annual 
conference, Du Bois provides a characteristically provocative rationale:  
 [A]ll art is propaganda and must ever be, despite the wailing of the purists. I stand 
 in utter shamelessness and say that whatever art I have for writing has been used 
 always for propaganda for gaining the right of black folk to love and enjoy. I do 
 not care a damn for any art that is not propaganda. But I do care when propaganda 
 is confined to one side while the other is stripped and silent. (“Criteria,” 296) 
Published later that year in The Crisis as “Criteria of Negro Art,” this seminal essay 
makes clear that Du Bois not only embraced propagandistic practices in his own art-
making, but also that he viewed propaganda as a necessary “criteria” for a group of 
people who had gone “stripped and silent” for far too long. Thus the most prominent 
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international figure of African American letters makes the unabashed claim that 
propaganda is a sui generis component of the project of Black liberation. Quieting his 
critics from the outset, Du Bois poses the rhetorical question: ‘‘How is it that an 
organization like [the NAACP], a group of radicals trying to bring new things into the 
world, a fighting organization which has come up out of the blood and dust of battle, 
struggling for the right of black men to be ordinary human beings—how is it that an 
organization of this kind can turn aside to talk about Art? After all, what have we who are 
slaves and black to do with Art?’” (“Criteria,” 295). His answer: “That somehow, 
somewhere eternal and perfect Beauty sits above Truth and Right I can conceive, but here 
and now and in the world in which I work they are for me unseparated and inseparable” 
(“Criteria,” 296). In his response to this hypothetical question, Du Bois denies the 
existence of a Platonic realm in which abstract qualities such as “Beauty,” “Truth,” and 
“Right” can be extricated from each other and from the social realities of those who, in 
creating art, foist upon the world a certain image of themselves. At the time of this 
lecture, notably at the height of the Harlem Renaissance, that world was still very much 
enshrouded by a veil of whiteness that, according to Du Bois, posited the project of art-
making as “inseparable” from the “[struggle] of the right of black men to be ordinary 
human beings.”  
 Building on Du Bois’s articulation of propaganda in “Criteria of Negro Art,” this 
essay considers the function and purpose of propaganda across three notable moments in 
Du Bois’s career: his journalistic work for The Crisis, his sociological and curatorial 
work for the 1900 Paris Exposition, and his fictional and autobiographical work in The 
Souls of Black Folk. This paper argues that Du Bois's international public relations 
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campaign built for the "new Negro" at the 1900 Paris Exposition, as well as his vision of 
“progress” articulated in Souls, respond to violent and nonsensical rhetorics emerging 
from the journals and lecterns of prominent Social Darwinists and eugenicists such as 
Herbert Spencer and Francis Galton. The implications of this project point toward a 
framing of Du Bois’s “double consciousness” as the epistemological foundation of a 
radical, pro-Black liberation movement in its infancy in the first decades of the 20
th
 
century. Moreover, this essay posits that Du Bois’s formulation of double consciousness 
establishes the unsettling existential terrain according to which propagandistic practice 
may be justified on ethical grounds. 
 To these ends, I will first unpack and critically assess the language of double 
consciousness that appears in The Souls of Black Folk. Second, I will explore in detail Du 
Bois’s remarks in The Crisis, in which he responds in polemical terms to the irrational 
claims of eugenicists and Social Darwinists. In the work excerpted here, Du Bois focuses 
attention particularly upon the dubious notion of “racial antagonism” that had come to 
form the logical foundation of scientific racism. Next, I will turn to Du Bois’s remarks 
prepared for the 1900 Paris Exposition alongside the startling array of photographs he 
and Thomas Calloway curated for it. These objects attest to Du Bois’s vision of the 
“Talented Tenth” that would come to form, after nearly three decades of propaganda, 
Alain LeRoy Locke’s conception of Negritude. Finally, I will turn to “Of the Coming of 
John” and “Of the Meaning of Progress,” essays in Souls that demonstrate a rhetorical 
shift in Du Bois’s vision of progress and attendant interest in the public relations value of 
sociological and autobiographical data on conditions of life for African Americans living 
in the global fin de siècle.       
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II. Double Consciousness, Propaganda, and the Ethics of Doubleness 
 For philosophers of race, Du Bois’s formulation of double consciousness has 
become perhaps the most interesting terminological feature of The Souls of Black Folk.
ii
 
As I shall demonstrate, double consciousness provides the ethical language that may 
justify the various projects Du Bois undertakes across media in response to claims of 
racial superiority by the eugenicists and their supporters. Moreover, double consciousness 
foregrounds propagandistic practice as a potentially necessary means for African 
Americans to achieve social and political change in an anti-Black racist culture such as 
the America in which Du Bois had been living and writing. 
  To arrive at a useful interpretive stance vis-à-vis double consciousness, I shall 
excerpt from Souls two important instantiations of the idea. First, in “Of Our Spiritual 
Strivings,” Du Bois defines the term: 
 After the Egyptian and sIndian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, 
 the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight 
 in this American world,—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, 
 but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a 
 peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at 
 one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a 
 world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,—an 
 American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two 
 warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being 
 torn asunder. (8-9) 
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In this passage, Du Bois advances double consciousness as a method of perceiving and 
interpreting the world that permits “no true self-consciousness, but only lets [‘the Negro’] 
see himself through the revelation of the other world.” That is, double consciousness 
implies inhabitation of a fractured identity that achieves its sense of self as a direct result 
of the ways in which others—notably, white others, “[looking] on in amused contempt 
and pity”—perceive that self. Importantly, the theory posits “sensation” and vision at its 
very center: for double consciousness is achieved by the somewhat paradoxical “sense of 
always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others.” In this way, Du Bois seems to 
regard double consciousness as both a curse and a “gift,” permitting those born “with a 
veil” a “second-sight” unavailable to those born without such a veil. On this point, it is 
worth noting that Du Bois presents double consciousness as something one may either be 
“born” with or without. While it is not clear whether Du Bois regards double 
consciousness to be a feature of perception that one acquires over time or at some 
discrete moment in one’s development, one can assume that he does not believe 
individuals are actually “born” with this “second-sight.”iii Finally, it should be noted that 
Du Bois’s “seventh son” is regarded to be explicitly both “Negro” and “American”; it is 
in the very schism between these two identity categories that the “peculiar sensation” of 
“twoness” becomes apparent. 
 In “Of the Faith of the Fathers,” Du Bois adduces in practical terms the 
epistemological dilemma facing this “seventh son”:  
 From the double life every American Negro must live, as a Negro and as an 
 American, as swept on by the current of the nineteenth while yet struggling in the 
 eddies of the fifteenth century,—from this must arise a painful self-
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 consciousness, an almost morbid sense of personality and a moral hesitancy 
 which is fatal to self-confidence. The worlds within and without the Veil of Color 
 are changing, and changing rapidly, but not at the same rate, not in the same 
 way; and this must produce a peculiar wrenching of the soul, a peculiar sense of 
 doubt and bewilderment. Such a double life, with double thoughts, double duties, 
 and double social classes, must give rise to double words and double ideals, and 
 tempt the mind to pretence [sic] or revolt, to hypocrisy or radicalism. (145, my 
 emphasis).  
Notably, Du Bois recognizes history and historical change as factors that have shaped, 
and that may continue to shape, the form of consciousness available to the (specifically 
African American) individual; for it is precisely the revelation that “the worlds within 
and without the Veil of Color” are changing, but “not at the same rate, not in the same 
way,” that produces this “peculiar sensation of doubt and bewilderment.”iv Implicit in 
such a formulation are the notions that history affects consciousness, and that change may 
be possible; that is, through social and political change, double consciousness may or 
may not be a perceptual mode this “seventh son” must necessarily bear in future 
generations. Moreover, in this second instance, Du Bois deploys the notion of 
“doubleness” to describe an ethical dilemma existentially entailed by living within the 
“Veil of Color.” This “peculiar sensation” leads them, with “double words and double 
ideals,” to lives motivated either by “pretence” and “hypocrisy” or “revolt” and 
“radicalism.” Double consciousness is therefore at least doubly insidious: in addition to 
producing a mode of perception whereby “the Negro” comes to define hisv sense of self 
in relation to how he is perceived by white others, it subtends the range of ethical and 
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existential choices available to him. In other words, this sense of “doubt and 
bewilderment” presents him with limited, and equally unhappy, options in terms of how 
he may go about making life decisions. These options are motivated in relation to how 
one must navigate one’s position within the Veil; one can either hide behind it and lead a 
life of “pretence” and “hypocrisy” or attempt to destroy or escape from it and lead a life 
of “revolt” and “radicalism.”vi  
 Thus, in The Souls of Black Folk, double consciousness is understood to signify 
on at least two significant registers. First, it is defined as a perceptual mode, a way of 
perceiving and interpreting the world. This perceptual mode accrues over time and may 
be impacted by historical forces. While “the seventh son” is construed to be born “with a 
Veil,” double consciousness attains in and through the experience of inhabiting a racist 
culture. Second, double consciousness may be understood to present an ethical dilemma, 
for it is a form of consciousness that circumscribes possibilities for self-expression and 
self-actualization for those born with black skin in an anti-Black racist culture. In this 
way, it is a form of self-awareness that is foisted upon the individual from without, 
affecting in turn the ethical and agential possibilities one may formulate from within. As 
such, double consciousness provides to those born with black skin in a racist culture a 
sense of “twoness” that gives them a “second-sight,” or an apprehension of the world 
unavailable to those born in that same culture with white skin.
vii
  
 This position of enforced ambiguity foregrounds the means by which Du Bois and 
other African American thinkers in his time may justifiably engage in propagandistic 
practices that, on the surface, may appear self-contradictory, “radical,” “pretentious,” or 
even hypocritical. As Du Bois notes, “hypocrisy” and “revolt” are in fact conceptual 
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categories that have been imposed upon African American individuals; during the time of 
Du Bois’s writing, there was no possibility from escaping these categories as conditions 
of one’s existence. Therefore, by engaging in propagandistic practices in and across 
multiple genres and media, Du Bois was merely enacting, in full force, the conceptual 
dilemma perpetuated by the anti-Black racist culture in which he had been living.  To wit: 
in projects such as The Crisis, the 1900 Paris Exposition, and The Souls of Black Folk, 
Du Bois performatively enacts the very position of double consciousness that American 
society insisted upon his occupying. As I shall demonstrate, Du Bois does not articulate 
double consciousness merely to identify and exenterate an oppressive perceptual mode. 
Rather, his discovery of this formulation provides the philosophical material with which 
he will become emboldened not only to respond to the “double speak” of the racist 
doctrines of his time, but also to engage in that very form of “double speak” and, in so 
doing, to eviscerate the arguments of the oppressor. In short, double consciousness 
becomes Du Bois’s ethical and epistemological platform for self-expression in a racist 
culture that seemingly demands African American intellectuals engage in propagandistic 
practice as a means of survival. 
 Importantly, I do not mean to imply that Du Bois was himself “pretentious” or 
“hypocritical.” To the contrary, I have posited that Du Bois takes in his work and “art” a 
shrewd and at times ludic interpretive stance with regard to the ethical dilemma of double 
consciousness. In this regard, one might say that he does much more than merely, in 
Houston Baker’s words, “refuse the master’s nonsense.” Anticipating Sarte and Fanon, 
Du Bois deploys double consciousness as a tactic of existential awareness and 
engagement. By performatively exposing double consciousness for both what it is and 
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what it does in and through his works—and by having evaluated the stakes of this stance 
in essays such as “Criteria”—Du Bois arguably resolves the Sartrean qua Fanonian 
dilemma whereby one with black skin in an anti-Black racist culture becomes reduced to 
one’s brute “facticity” (what Fanon refers to in Black Skin, White Masks [1956] as “The 
Fact of Blackness”) and thereby stripped of “transcendence,” or one’s interpretive stance 
with regard to one’s factic attributes. Du Bois’s awareness and adoption of double 
consciousness is always already a critique of his facticity.
viii
 I do not perceive in this 
enactment anything approaching the “pretentious” or “hypocritical”; rather, such an 
enactment is a performative critique of these very categories, even further distinguishing 
Du Bois’s project from that of an “accomodationalist” such as Booker T. Washington.  
III. DuBois on Racial Antagonism and Social Darwinism   
  There exists to-day a widespread and fatuous belief in the power of 
 environment . . . to alter heredity . . . Such beliefs have done much damage in the 
 past and if allowed to go uncontradicted, may do even more serious damage in the 
 future. Thus the view that the Negro slave was an unfortunate cousin of the white 
 man, deeply tanned by the tropic sun and denied the blessings of Christianity and 
 civilization, played no small part with the sentimentalists of the Civil War period 
 and it has taken us fifty years to learn that speaking English, wearing good clothes 
 and going to school and church does not transform a Negro into a white man.   
    —Madison Grant, American Eugenics Society (1916)ix 
 In a surprisingly obscure 1981 essay, Carol M. Taylor combs through volumes of 
The Crisis, the NAACAP’s civil rights magazine founded by Du Bois in 1910, to 
demonstrate his vehement critiques of racist discourses that prevailed in the hard and 
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social sciences of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Taylor notes that Du 
Bois, “armed with impeccable credentials and access to a massive audience . . . attacked 
the scientific underpinnings of racial discrimination” in this periodical over a span of 
more than 10 years (450). Taylor focuses her consideration on Du Bois’s argumentative 
style or “rhetoric,” through which he persuasively debunks a range of scientific myths 
regarding the presumed superiority of white over black Americans in the domains of 
health, morality, ability, and intelligence. It would be a vast understatement to claim that 
Du Bois’s work in The Crisis responds directly to racist arguments emerging from 
the Social Darwinist and eugenicist movements of the time. Indeed, the sociological 
value of Du Bois’s work—and the very discipline of sociology, then in its infancy—may 
be regarded as an institutionally-sanctioned response to abuses of fact perpetuated by 
racist doctrines emerging from some of the most esteemed academic institutions in the 
world in the first decades of the twentieth century.  
 The macroscopic mission of The Crisis was most vividly encapsulated in a public 
debate years after Du Bois left his position at the periodical. In 1929, Du Bois engaged in 
a charged exchange with Lothrop Stoddard, prominent eugenicist, lawyer, and Professor 
of History at Harvard University, in response to the question: “Should the Negro Be 
Encouraged to Cultural Equality?” Stoddard, responding mainly to arguments in Alain 
LeRoy Locke’s The New Negro (1925), claims: 
 [The] Negro intelligensia rejects the biracial system of the South, inveighs against 
 the color-line, and threatens our social order with their embittered enmity unless 
 White America admits them to full equality, with its logical implication—racial 
 amalgamation . . . For the Negro’s own sake, as well as in the interests of social 
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 peace, he ought to be told,—tolerantly yet unequivocally—that this new hope is 
 delusion, which, if persisted in, will lead to unnecessary disappointments and 
 misfortunes . . . For let there be no mistake: White America will not abolish the 
 color-line, will not admit the Negro to social equality, will not open the door to 
 racial amalgamation. That is the meat of the matter. If this spells trouble, then 
 trouble there must be. But the best way to minimize the trouble is to speak frankly 
 at the start, thus checking the spread of false hopes and limiting the resultant 
 bitterness of disillusion. (511-12) 
 Responding to the same question, Du Bois argues the affirmative position then 
attacks the logic of Stoddard’s claims: 
 Some people might assume that this rise of the American Negro from slavery to 
 freedom . . . would bring unstinted applause. Negroes themselves expected 
 this . . . On the contrary, all Negroes know that with all the generous praise given 
 us there has been no phase of the advance that has not been looked on with a 
 strong undercurrent of apprehension. America has feared the coming forward of 
 these black men; it has looked upon it as a sort of threat—and if you should ask 
 just why that is so, white Americans would state the thesis which they have stated 
 before but with some modification; they would say that the coming forward of 
 these people does not prove that they can make as great a gift to culture as the 
 white people have made; but whether they can or not, they must not be allowed to 
 come forward because it threatens civilization! (Zuckerman, 39, my emphasis).  
 Du Bois makes the case that such arguments stand fallaciously on what he refers 
to as “the quantitative argument,” whereby “there is only a certain amount of culture in 
 13 
 
 
 
the world; if you divide it up among all the people you have that much less for other 
people” (Zuckerman, 39). Here Du Bois implicitly critiques the prevailing doctrine that 
emerged from eugenicist and Social Darwinist thought: the application of the Darwinian 
notion of “survival of the fittest” to domains of society and culture. So-called “racial 
antagonism,” the prevailing logic through which the majority of these racist arguments 
had been made, was an outgrowth of emerging trends in Social Darwinism that argued 
for the intrinsic necessity of conflict between races. According to Taylor, one corollary 
resulting from the argument was that “reformist schemes were futile and dangerous 
attempts to tamper with the natural and inexorable progress of evolution”; a second 
corollary was that “social conflict, such as the conflict between the races, was natural and 
desirable” (451).  
 The doctrine of racial antagonism received Du Bois’s full attention a full fifteen 
years before his debate with Stoddard in the September, 1914 issue of The Crisis. I quote 
nearly in full “Does Race Antagonism Serve Any Good Purpose,” in which Du Bois 
draws attention to the fourfold feature of this myth. 
        1. [Racial Antipathy] is an instinctive repulsion from something harmful and  
              is, therefore, a subtle condition of ultimate survival. 
      The difficulty with this theory is that it does not square with the facts: race 
 antipathy is not instinctive but a matter of careful education. Black and white 
 children play together gladly and know no prejudice until it is implanted precept 
 upon precept and by strong social pressure; and when it is so implanted it is just 
 as strong in cases where there is no physical difference as it is where physical 
 differences are striking. The racial repulsion in the Balkans among peoples of 
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 practically the same blood is to-day greater than it was between whites and blacks 
 on the Virginia plantation.
x
  
 In this first principle, Du Bois makes the claim, at the time quite radical, that 
racial antipathy is a learned behavior. In this regard he joins Franz Boas, who in 1911 had 
proclaimed, largely to deaf ears in his field of expertise, “the old idea of absolute stability 
of human types must . . . evidently be given up, and with it the belief of the hereditary 
superiority of certain types over others” (Liss, 103). Julie E. Liss notes the convergence 
in thought between the two men: “Sharing an antiracist agenda, Boas and Du Bois were 
struggling to institutionalize their arguments by furthering research to counter scientific 
racism and by participating in public discussions to promote their ideas,” though “the 
implications of these findings . . . were ignored at the time as they were revolutionary” 
(136). Liss notes that these implications spelled out an “anti-deterministic view of 
difference that, combined with Boas’s own assimilationist leanings, suggested a new 
basis for coexistence” (136). Du Bois’s views had certainly been shaped by the thought 
of Boas, and vice versa, as evidenced by the second of Du Bois’s responses to the theory 
of racial antagonism: that “whether instinctive or not, [racial antagonism] is a reasonable 
measure of self-defense against undesirable racial traits.” Du Bois elaborates fully: 
      This second proposition is the one which usually follows careful examination 
 of the first. After all, it is an unimportant fact. Instincts are simply accumulated 
 reasons in the individual or in the race. The reasons for antagonizing inferior races 
 are clear and may be summed up as follows:  
  Poor health and stamina.  
  Low ability.  
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  Harmful ideals of life. 
      We are now on surer ground because we can now appeal to facts. But no 
 sooner  do we make this appeal than we are astonished to find that there are 
 surprisingly little data: Is it true that the Negro as a physical specimen is inferior 
 to the white man or is he superior? Is the high death rate of the Indian a proof of 
 his poor physique or is it proof of wretched conditions of life which would long 
 ago have killed off a weaker people? And, again, is spiritual superiority always in 
 direct proportion to physical strength in races any more than in individuals? 
 Connected with this matter of health comes the question of physical beauty, but 
 surely, if beauty were to become a standard of survival how small our world 
 population would be!
xi
 
 With regard to the question of “health” and the related issue of “survival,” racist 
ideology led scholars in the late nineteenth century to conclude that African Americans 
were dying out. Taylor notes that in 1884, Nathaniel Shaler, dean of the Lawrence 
Scientific School at Harvard, “suggested . . . that blacks were becoming extinct” (451). 
Frederick L. Hoffman’s Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro suggested the 
same, warning “that the high incidence of tuberculosis and venereal disease among 
blacks arose from their inherent immorality, and would eventually destroy them” (Taylor, 
451). As Du Bois notes in The Crisis and elaborates in his remarks for the 1900 Paris 
Exposition, this data was flawed and biased, and obviously untrue given “the wonderful 
reproductive powers of the blacks”xii evidenced in his sociological reports.  
 Using sound logic and an appeal to fact—along with healthy doses of humor and 
wit—Du Bois disseminated his message to some 100,000 subscribers to the periodical, 
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vastly extending the scope of responses to scientific racism. Following this second point, 
Du Bois continues, discussing the issue of intellect:  
 It is argued . . . that it may be granted that the physical stamina of all the races is 
 probably approximately the same and that physical comeliness is rather a matter 
 of taste and selection than of absolute racial difference. However, when it comes 
 to intellectual ability the races differ so enormously that superior races must in 
 self-defense repel the inferior sternly, even brutally. Two things, however, must       
            be said in answer to this: First, the prejudice against the Jews, long and world 
 wide, is surely not based on inferior ability . . . Moreover, if we compare the 
 intellectual ability of Teuton and Chinese which is inferior? Or, if we take the 
 Englishman and Bantu, is the difference a difference of native ability or of 
 training and environment? The answer to this is simple: We do not know.
xiii
  
 Taylor notes that still-controversial I.Q. testing methodologies arose from 
concerns related to strategies deployed by eugenicists and Social Darwinists. “In the early 
1900’s,” she writes, “scientific racism gained an additional impetus from the 
psychologists. The I.Q. tests demonstrated that the children of college professors, bank 
presidents, and the like displayed superior mental ability. The results were considered 
proof of the value of good heredity . . . [and] provided a powerful weapon for the racists” 
(453). The response to the case of blacks who possessed exceptional intellect is typified, 
again, by the remarks of Stoddard:  
 If, now, the 10,500,000 Negroes in America can produce a few outstanding 
 geniuses in the arts and sciences, this numerically minute elite can settle the 
 question in advance of the patiently plodding millions. The Negro race, having 
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 demonstrated that it can produce some really gifted individuals, thereby 
 conclusively disproves the charge or racial inferiority. The basic reason for the 
 present attitude toward the Negro thus becomes nonsense, and the only thing left 
 for open minded White Americans to do is,— “gracefully capitulate” . . . In 
 answer to which I, to use a legal phrase, demur. Now a demurrer means, in every- 
 day language: What of it? and I, being a New England Yankee, exercise my 
 ancestral prerogative by answering with a question, and say: “What of it?”  
 (Stoddard, 512)  
 In short, Stoddard and those of his ilk do not know how to respond to the apparent 
paradox of black genius, and thus invoke rhetorical posturing and appeals to “ancestral 
prerogative” to make a non-existent case. As Taylor notes, intellectuals like Stoddard 
invoked the notion that black genius might only be explained through the process of 
miscegenation. “A highly intelligent black,” she writes, “was not an argument against the 
race’s incurable inferiority. Science had decreed that blacks were not intelligent. 
Therefore, any intelligent person had some amount of white blood, regardless of how 
black he or she appeared to be. To be otherwise was logically impossible” (453). Noting 
the obvious flaws in such reasoning, Taylor concludes that “as long as scientific sanction 
for racism remained a closed system, a persuasive argument for significant progress of 
the American black was impossible to construct” (453).  
 The double-paradox of this argument is that if such “genius” might only arise 
from the “intermingling” of races, there ought be no need to argue against 
“intermingling” on the basis of racial antagonism; according to this dubious logic, 
miscegenation obviously had done the world evolutionary good, in the example of 
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exceptional intellect, for all parties involved. Du Bois deploys similar deconstructive 
reasoning in his third and fourth tenets against racial antagonism, which I quote nearly in 
full. 
      3. Racial antipathy is a method of Race Development. 
      . . . Is not racial antipathy a method of maintaining the European level of 
 culture? But is it necessary for the runner to hate and despise the man he is out- 
 distancing? Can we only maintain culture in one race by increasing barbarism in 
 others? Does it enhance the ‘superiority’ of white men to allow them to steal from 
 yellow men and enslave black men and reduce colored women to concubinage 
 and prostitution? Surely not. Admitting that in the world’s history again and again 
 this or that race has out-stripped another in culture, it is impossible to prove that 
 inherent racial superiority was the cause or that the level of culture has been 
 permanently raised in one race by keeping other races down. 
      4. Race Antipathy is a method of group specialization. 
      . . . admits the essential equality of races but insists on the difference in gifts 
 and argues that antipathy between races allows each to develop its own peculiar 
 gifts and aptitudes. Does it? That depends on the “antipathy.” If antipathy means 
 the enslaving of the African, the exploitation of the Chinese, the peonage of 
 Mexicans and the denial of schools to American Negroes then it is hard to see 
 where the “encouragement” comes in. If it means that the generous 
 encouragement of all men according to their fits and ability then why speak of 
 race “antipathy” or encourage it? Let us call it Human Uplift and Universal 
 Brotherhood and be done with it.
xiv
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Summarizing, Du Bois notes: 
 Such are the arguments. Most persons use all four at once and skillfully skip from 
 one to the other. Each argument has in other days been applied to individuals and 
 social classes, but we have outgrown that. We apply it to-day to “races” because 
 race is a vague, unknown term which may be made to cover a multitude of sins. 
 After all, what is a “Race?” and how many races are there? Von Luschan, one of 
 the greatest of modern anthropologists, says: “The question of the number of 
 human races has quite lost its raison d’ être, and has become a subject rather of 
 philosophic speculation than of scientific research.” What we have on earth is 
 men. Shall we help them or hinder them? Shall we hate and kill them or love and 
 preserve and uplift them? Which method will do us most good? This is the real 
 question of “Race” antipathy.xv 
 In moving between and across genres and medias, Du Bois exposes racial 
antagonism as a volatile mode of rhetorical posturing that is at once absurd and absurdly 
efficient in its power to incite barbaric acts in the name of science, “civilization,” and 
“fact.” As typified by these remarks, Du Bois enacts public relations as a mode of 
survival; as a mode of “social uplift”; and ultimately, as a striving for accuracy against 
the outright fudging or misrepresentation of fact that enabled and emboldened racist 
scientific dogma to spread throughout his time. Du Bois’s search for truth, “despite its 
possible unpleasantness,”xvi led him several years earlier to organize an exhibit on the 
“American Negro” at the 1900 Paris Exposition, where his properly sociological work—
equally concerned with the notion of dispelling the myth of racial antagonism—receives 
public recognition on an international stage.  
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IV. Curating Progress: Du Bois and the 1900 Paris Exposition 
 Du Bois believed that the study of the “Negro” (he insisted on this term, and on 
its capitalization
xvii
) in America provided an intellectual paradigm for research in the 
emerging discipline of sociology. In the November, 1900 edition of The American 
Monthly Review of Reviews, Du Bois writes, “I think it may safely be asserted that never 
in the history of the modern world has there been presented to men of a great nation so 
rare an opportunity to observe and measure and study the evolution of a great branch of 
the human race as is given to Americans in the study of the American Negro. Here is a 
crucial test on a scale that is astounding and under circumstances peculiarly 
fortunate.”xviii Prepared for the 1900 Paris Exposition, these remarks—along with the 
voluminous collection of photographs he and Thomas Calloway curated for the 
Exposition—indicate both a direction and a method for sociological research that 
accounts for “the minute study of limited fields of human action, where observation and 
accurate measurement are possible and where real illuminating knowledge can be had.”xix 
Du Bois begins his accompanying notes on the exposition as follows:   
 On the banks of the Seine, opposite the Rue des Nations, stands a large, plain 
 white building, where the promoters of the Paris Exposition have housed the 
 world's ideas of sociology. The United States section of this building is small, and 
 not, at first glance, particularly striking . . . In the right-hand corner, however, as  
 one enters, is an exhibit which, more than most others in the building, is  
 sociological in the larger sense of the term—that is, is an attempt to give, in as  
 systematic and compact a form as possible, the history and present condition of a 
 large group of human beings. This is the exhibit of American Negroes, planned 
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 and executed by Negroes, and collected and installed under the direction of a 
 Negro special agent, Mr. Thomas J. Calloway.
xx
  
 In naming his exhibit “sociological in the larger sense of the term,” Du Bois 
tacitly critiques the very institution of sociology, still in its infancy, while offering a 
clear-cut definitional standard by which sociological work ought be judged: as “an 
attempt to give, in as systematic and compact a form as possible, the history and present 
condition of a large group of human beings.” The  rhetorical gestures in this passage are 
classically DuBoisian; the description evokes, first of all, contrasts of color and size (note 
the telling inclusion of words such as “large,” “larger,” “plain,” “white,” and “compact”) 
to highlight at once the scale and specificity of the work assembled. The triple-repetition 
of the word “Negro” drives home the notion that this is no common exhibit; for the first 
time in history, Du Bois is surely aware, the “American Negro” will enter the world 
intellectual stage, and he will do so with and on his own terms. Most tellingly of all, 
perhaps, is the notably “large, plain, white building” in which sits the Exposition’s most 
interesting exhibit, “planned and executed by Negroes,” for which Du Bois and Calloway 
won a Gold Medal from the Parisian organizers.  
 As in Souls, in “The American Negro at Paris,” Du Bois consciously enacts the 
persona of the global thinker, the public intellectual qua diplomat, to lyricize through 
various disciplinary forms and media what had been a partially written history—a history 
largely without form or “discipline” at all. In doing so, Du Bois seems acutely aware of 
his position at the vanguard of intellectual production in his particular field and of the 
tremendous responsibilities entailed and demanded by this position. This may explain, in 
part, the variety of photographs chosen for inclusion in the exhibit, as well as the 
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categories under which they were literally contained in albums titled “U.S.A.,” “Types of 
American Negroes,” “Georgia,” and “Negro Life in Georgia.”xxi According to Du Bois, 
the exhibit contained  
 the usual paraphernalia for catching the eye--photographs, models, industrial 
 work, and pictures. But it does not stop here; beneath all this is a carefully 
 thought-out plan, according to which the exhibitors have tried to show:  
  (a) The history of the American Negro. 
  (b) His present condition. 
  (c) His education. 
  (d) His literature.
xxii
 
While this may be true, an overwhelming number of photographs selected seem intent not 
on representing the “present condition of the American Negro,” categorically speaking; 
such an endeavor would have required, of course, the inclusion of photographs 
demonstrating the realities of racial violence and segregation in nineteenth century 
America, especially in the South, where a large number of the photos were taken. By 
contrast, a great number of photos shown at the Paris Exhibition indicate an optimism, 
reinforced by the language of “progress” contained in Du Bois’s article, that seems to 
have been recast by the time he publishes Souls just a few years later. The sociological 
data included in the Paris report are surprising and revealing:    
 At a glance one can see the successive steps by which the 220,000 Negroes of 
 1750 [in Georgia] had increased to 7,500,000 in 1890; their distribution 
 throughout the different States; a comparison of the size of the Negro population 
 with European countries bringing out the striking fact that there are nearly half as 
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 many Negroes in the United States as Spaniards in Spain. The striking movement 
 by which the 4 1/5 percent of Negroes living in the cities in 1860 has increased to 
 12 percent in 1890 is shown, as is also the fact that recognized mulattoes have 
 increased 50 percent in 30 years, even in the defective census returns. Twenty 
 percent of the Negroes are shown to be home-owners, 60 percent of their children 
 are in school, and their illiteracy is less than that of Russia, and only equal to that 
 of Hungary. (575) 
 Du Bois boasts of the martial prowess of African American men, noting the 
number of “Negro medal-of-honor men in the army and navy”; and he notes anecdotally, 
“It was a Massachusetts lawyer who replied to the Patent Office inquiry, ‘I never knew a 
negro to invent anything but lies’; and yet here is a record of 350 patents granted to black 
men since 1834” (576). These impressive statistics, originally represented in a series of 
graphs, continue to describe a “typical Southern State,” Georgia: 
      It would hardly be suggested, in the light of recent history, that conditions in 
 the State of Georgia are such as to give a rose-colored picture of the Negro; and 
 yet Georgia, having the largest Negro population, is an excellent field of study. 
 Here again we have statistics: the increase of the black population in a century 
 from 30,000 to 860,000,
xxiii
 the huddling in the Black Belt for self-protection 
 since the war, and a comparison of the age distribution with France showing the 
 wonderful reproductive powers of the blacks. The school enrollment has 
 increased from 10,000 in 1870 to 180,000 in 1897, and the Negroes are 
 distributed among the occupations as follows: 
      In agriculture, 62 per cent.; in domestic and personal service, 28 per cent.; in   
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            manufacturing and mechanical industries, 5 per cent.; in trade and transportation, 
 4 1/2 per cent.; in the professions, 1/2 per cent. They own 1,000,000 acres of land 
 and pay taxes on $12,000,000 worth of property—not large, but telling figures; 
 and the charts indicate, from year to year, the struggle they have had to 
 accumulate and hold this property. (576)
xxiv
 
 That Du Bois explicitly and favorably compares the “Black Belt” of America to 
developed European nations is not surprising when one sees the photographs. Over 350 in 
all, the photographs depict a great number of men and women in aristocratic finery; large 
and beautiful homes, shops, churches, and factories owned and operated by African 
Americans; and a great number of scenes taken from the laboratories and classrooms of 
universities such as Atlanta, Howard, Tuskegee, and Fisk. Moreover, the images greatly 
range in terms of geography, gender representation, and in the complexions of those 
represented.  
 Below, I present five broadly representative images. 
 Recovered from the Library of Congress Website, “5 female Negro officers of 
Women's League, Newport, R.I.” demonstrates Du Bois’s interest in representing the 
efficiency and organizational coherence of African American sub-interest groups, in this 
case presided over by politically engaged women in New England. A sense of uniformity, 
stability, and civility is reinforced by the poise, fashionable attire, facial expressions, and 
symmetrical arrangement of figures in the photo; perhaps notably, the darkest-skinned 
figure is at the photo’s center.      
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 Likewise, “Dentistry at Howard University, Washington, D.C., ca. 1900” features 
African Americans of varying complexions, ages, and genders performing skilled 
intellectual labor in a highly stylized, urbane setting which suggests an air of refinement 
and cosmopolitanism: 
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 In “Composing room of the Planet newspaper, Richmond, Virginia,” African 
American men, likewise dressed in professional attire, work in a printing press.  
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 Du Bois includes several representative images of large, well-manicured, 
mansion-like homes, demonstrating the wealth and arguably good taste of their 
undoubtedly proud owners; in this case, one Bishop Gaines of Atlanta.  
 
 Finally, Du Bois provides images of several successful businesses owned by 
African-Americans; this is Coleman Manufacturing Company, “a Negro operated cotton 
mill” in North Carolina.  
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 While one can only speculate as to who took these photos (they are all 
unattributed) or for what purpose—Du Bois does not elaborate on the details of their 
procurement, other than by suggesting that Thomas Calloway played some role in 
securing them—the highly stylized, tableau-like quality of the images suggests that in at 
least some cases, they may have been taken for the explicit purposes of the Exhibition. 
Whatever the motivation, the overwhelming impression one receives when looking at 
these photos, and while reading Du Bois’s accompanying text, is one of un-ironized 
progress and achievement. It might be argued that while the exhibit achieves, on the one 
hand, Du Bois’ goal of “[giving], in as systematic and compact a form as possible, the 
history and present condition of a large group of human beings,” it may likewise and 
simultaneously be read to serve as a public relations campaign for the face of the “new 
Negro,” a face hardly recognizable to most Americans themselves, as Du Bois wryly 
notes: “There are several volumes of photographs of typical Negro faces, which hardly 
square with conventional American ideas” (emphasis added).xxv  
 While the selected photos cannot begin to represent the diversity of the exhibit—
which also includes idyllic, pastoral images of African American workers in fields and in 
factories—not a single image chosen for the exhibition suggests racial violence, and very 
few of them even hint at racial inequality. Overwhelmingly, however, the photos indicate 
that African Americans at the time were living in conditions of institutionally entrenched, 
if not altogether uncomfortable, racial segregation from whites. In short, the images and 
accompanying textual rhetoric would necessarily suggest to the European nations 
gathered at the Exposition that life for the “new Negro” was as variegated as life for 
Americans at large; that African Americans, too, wore fine clothes, owned fine homes 
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and shops, owned and worked for important businesses, obtained degrees, chaired 
societies, succeeded intellectually and entrepreneurially; and that measurable progress for 
African Americans could be demonstrably and overwhelmingly documented, possibly to 
the calculated surprise of those attending the exhibit.
xxvi
 In these ways, the photos and 
accompanying data posit African American progress in the form of compelling visual and 
sociological fact, which stood directly and defiantly in the face of the racist scientific 
dogma of the time. 
 As with his later work in The Crisis, the Exposition showcases Du Bois’s interest 
in using various media, modes of address, and styles of critique to confront, in the 
language and guise of science, the biases of scientific enterprises that formed the 
foundations of American racist ideology.  As the concluding section of this essay will 
demonstrate, Du Bois will temporarily sidestep this tactic in The Souls of Black Folk as 
he embarks on making a fraught case for the “new Negro” in explicitly literary terms.  
       
V. “Progress” and Propaganda in The Souls of Black Folk 
 History is but the record of . . . group-leadership; and yet how infinitely changeful 
 is its type and character! And of all types and kinds, what can be more instructive 
 than the leadership of a group within a group?—that curious double movement 
 where real progress may be negative and actual advance be relative retrogression. 
 All this is the social student's inspiration and despair.  
   —Du Bois, “Of Mr. Booker T. Washington and Others”xxvii 
 In The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois articulates a decidedly more nuanced and 
outright troubling vision of progress, the political and public stakes of which may be best 
 30 
 
 
 
understood in terms of his vexed relation to Booker T. Washington’s vision of progress 
for African Americans.
xxviii
 In his chapter on Washington, Du Bois notes:  
 To gain the sympathy and cooperation of the various elements comprising the 
 white South was Mr. Washington's first task; and this, at the time Tuskegee was 
 founded, seemed, for a black man, well-nigh impossible. And yet ten years later it 
 was done in the word spoken at Atlanta: “In all things purely social we can be as 
 separate as the five fingers, and yet one as the hand in all things essential to 
 mutual progress.” (25) 
 In stark contrast to Washington’s rhetoric of pragmatism, “accommodation,” and 
interest in “mutual progress”—and in relatively stark contrast to the rhetoric of progress 
suggested in “The American Negro at Paris” and in the pages of The Crisis—Du Bois 
invokes “progress” in Souls in order to critique the very meaning and purpose of the term. 
The term, in noun and verb form, appears twenty-two times in the text and at three 
noteworthy intersections in the first chapter, “Of Our Spiritual Strivings”:  
      1. The cold statistician wrote down the inches of progress here and there, noted 
 also where here and there a foot had slipped or someone had fallen. (8) 
      2. But alas! while sociologists gleefully count [“the Negro’s”] bastards and his 
 prostitutes, the very soul of the toiling, sweating black man is darkened by the 
 shadow of a vast despair. Men call the shadow prejudice, and learnedly explain it 
 as the natural defense of culture against barbarism, learning against ignorance, 
 purity against crime, the "higher" against the "lower" races. To which the Negro 
 cries Amen! and swears that to so much of this strange prejudice as is founded on 
 just homage to civilization, culture, righteousness, and progress, he humbly bows 
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 and meekly does obeisance. (9)  
      3. Away with the black man's ballot, by force or fraud,—and behold the 
 suicide of a race! Nevertheless, out of the evil came something of good,—the 
 more careful adjustment of education to real life, the clearer perception of the 
 Negroes' social responsibilities, and the sobering realization of the meaning of 
 progress. (9) 
 In the first two instances, Du Bois invokes “progress” to demonstrate, primarily, 
how the term is used by scientists—“statisticians” and “sociologists”—to paint a certain, 
inaccurate picture of the lives of “American Negros.” In the third instance, he suggests 
the term has either lost its “meaning,” that it no longer means what it might once have 
meant, or that it means something very particular to his subject of study.  
 The term is most subtly, powerfully, and pointedly ironized in the chapter “Of the 
Meaning of Progress,” in which it appears just three times, including the chapter title. 
Recalling his days as a schoolteacher in rural Tennessee, Du Bois invokes idyllic, sun-
soaked language to paint a picture of his early manhood.  He begins the chapter, 
 Once upon a time I taught school in the hills of Tennessee, where the broad dark 
 vale of the Mississippi begins to roll and crumple to greet the Alleghanies. I was a 
 Fisk student then, and all Fisk men thought that Tennessee—beyond the Veil— 
 was theirs alone, and in vacation time they sallied forth in lusty bands to meet the 
 county school- commissioners. Young and happy, I too went, and I shall not soon 
 forget that summer, seventeen years ago. (35) 
 Given the polemical tone of the preceding and succeeding chapters, that Du Bois 
begins this one with a well-worn rhetorical cliché—“once upon a time”—immediately 
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indicates ironic distance between what he is saying and what he is describing. Moreover, 
the phrase indicates that what he is about to tell us is a tale, something that (however 
autobiographical) might be best understood in allegorical or fanciful terms. Rosy, 
Dickensian language of this sort dominates the chapter as Du Bois describes in gossipy 
detail various characters he encounters in the schoolhouse and town, including the Burkes 
and Dowells; principal among these characters is Josie, a “thin, homely girl of twenty, 
with a dark-brown face and thick, hard hair” (36). Even when Du Bois references 
violence, his tone remains whimsical, consistent with the rhetorical tradition of the fairy 
tale: 
      The mass of those to whom slavery was a dim recollection of childhood found 
 the world a puzzling thing: it asked little of them, and they answered with little, 
 and yet it ridiculed their offering.  
      Such a paradox they could not understand, and therefore sank into listless 
 indifference, or shiftlessness, or reckless bravado. There were, however, some— 
 such as Josie, Jim, and Ben—to whom War, Hell, and Slavery were but childhood 
 tales, whose young appetites had been whetted to an edge by school and story and 
 half-awakened thought. Ill could they be content, born without and beyond the 
 World. And their weak wings beat against their barriers,—barriers of caste, of 
 youth, of life; at last, in dangerous moments, against everything that opposed even 
 a whim. (38)  
 Du Bois sustains the picturesque tone until he reveals, with no foreshadowing, 
what he discovers upon his return to the land beyond the “broad dark vale of the 
Mississippi” ten years later: “Josie was dead, and the gray-haired mother said simply, 
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‘We've had a heap of trouble since you've been away’” followed by the revelation, “My 
log schoolhouse was gone. In its place stood Progress; and Progress, I understand, is 
necessarily ugly” (39-40). Possibly recalling the cadence, vocabulary, punctuation, and 
somber tone of the concluding lines of Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient Mariner,xxix Du 
Bois concludes his own personal account both softly and fatally:  
      My journey was done, and behind me lay hill and dale, and Life and Death. 
 How shall man measure Progress there where the dark-faced Josie lies? How 
 many heartfuls of sorrow shall balance a bushel of wheat? How hard a thing is life 
 to the lowly, and yet how human and real! And all this life and love and strife and 
 failure,—is it the twilight of nightfall or the flush of some faint-dawning day? 
      Thus sadly musing, I rode to Nashville in the Jim Crow car. (41) 
 Eschewing the rhetoric of his sociological, journalistic, and polemical work, in 
“Of the Meaning of Progress,” Du Bois invokes and inverts trite poetic conventions to 
communicate sorrow in language that must be understood as intentionally stylized and 
stilted—in Baker’s words, a “voice ceaselessly [invoking] ancestral spirits and ancient 
formulas that move toward an act of cultural triumph” (121). In this way, the cultural and 
public relations work of “Progress” dovetails with Du Bois’s efforts at the Paris 
Exposition and anticipates the rhetoric of the The Crisis. Even so, at the level of rhetoric, 
“Progress” departs sharply, with finely controlled irony that guts the sentimental mode in 
which he performs his intervention, from the nakedly propagandistic agenda of his 
sociological and journalistic tracts. In short, the ironizing tone of the “sentimental” 
passages in “Progress” appropriates the schematics of the fairy tale to achieve two things. 
First, this tone draws attention to the mythologic features of discourses motivated by a 
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quest for “fact.” Simultaneously, Du Bois demonstrates that such a quest serves mainly to 
anoint the interests of a mode of “propaganda . . . confined to one side” that made 
scientific racism so compelling in its day.
xxx
 
 While Josie’s tale is rendered such that we are left to guess as to the precise nature 
of her demise, in “Of the Coming of John,” the fate of the fictional hero of the tale is far 
more clearly articulated. Having left his rural home town of Altamaha to seek an 
education in the city, John solemnly attains double consciousness and apprehends the 
thickness of the Veil for the first time: 
 He grew slowly to feel almost for the first time the Veil that lay between him and 
 the white world; he first noticed now the oppression that had not seemed 
 oppression before, differences that erstwhile seemed natural, restraints and slights 
 that in his boyhood days had gone unnoticed or been greeted with a laugh. (122)  
 Having received an education and experienced, however briefly, the “grave and 
gay” (122) pulse of life in New York, John decides to return home following a surprise 
encounter with his white “double,” a young man also named John from the same town, in 
a posh Manhattan theater. When John returns, he secures a position as a teacher from the 
Judge, “white John’s” father, who issues a warning: 
 Now I like the colored people, and sympathize with all their reasonable 
 aspirations; but you and I both know, John, that in this country the Negro must 
 remain subordinate, and can never expect to be the equal of white men. In their 
 place, your people can be honest and respectful; and God knows, I'll do what I can 
 to help them. But when they want to reverse nature, and rule white men, and 
 marry white women, and sit in my parlor, then, by God! we'll hold them under if 
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 we have to lynch every Nigger in the land. (126)  
 John accepts the position but is eventually fired for his subversive lectures, thus 
finding himself an alien in his own land. Shortly thereafter, he attacks and kills white 
John, whom he had witnessed molesting his sister. Toward the end of the tale, John 
stands on the edge of the sea, listening to the rage of a lynch mob approaching him. 
Unlike Josie, whose death is communicated plainly but not described in detail, John’s 
death is foretold but not documented within the pages of the story. Humming along, 
notably, to Wagner’s “Song of the Bride,” John stands his ground as the mob approaches.  
      Amid the trees in the dim morning twilight he watched their shadows dancing 
 and heard their horses thundering toward him, until at last they came sweeping 
 like a storm, and he saw in front that haggard white-haired man, whose eyes 
 flashed red with fury. Oh, how he pitied him,— pitied him,—and wondered if he 
 had the coiling twisted rope. Then, as the storm burst round him, he rose slowly to 
 his feet and turned his closed eyes toward the Sea. 
      And the world whistled in his ears. (130) 
 As in the concluding paragraph of “Progress,” the word “twilight” is invoked to 
indicate a noumenal perceptual space that may suggest, in its paradoxical strangeness, the 
very dilemma of inhabiting double consciousness. The term may also suggest the ever-
present possibility for those who inhabit double consciousness to become “eclipsed” by 
some unexpected, and thoroughly illogical, calamity. Yet, in suggesting that life-
threatening concerns for black Americans would stubbornly persist into the twentieth 
century, “Of the Coming of John” allegorizes the existential crisis of the “new Negro” 
more vividly than any essay in Souls. In stark contrast to the vision of optimism and 
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progress depicted in the photos and accompanying captions of the 1900 Paris Exposition, 
“John,” like “Progress,” paints an ominous—one might even say cynical—picture for the 
future of Black America. 
 While Arnold Rampersad notes that the central concern of “John” is “the dilemma 
of the educated black aspirant to culture, whose strivings are frustrated by injustice” (75), 
the tale likewise and simultaneously critiques contemporary scientific discourses that had 
justified the logic of lynching, perhaps the most insidious of all doctrines inspired by the 
Social Darwinists. In 1914, the same year Du Bois critiques the reason of “racial 
antagonism” in The Crisis, sociologist L. F. Ward argued that lynching was merely a 
natural byproduct of evolution. According to Ward, the African American man pursued 
and raped white women as a consequence of the “unheard and imperious voice of nature 
commanding him at the risk of ‘lynch law’ to raise his race to a little higher level” (369-
70). Summarizing Ward’s “rape / lynching” argument—which was not the only of its 
kind—Taylor notes, 
 Whites reacted violently because of an equally instinctive determination to protect 
 their race from inferior strains . . . Although Ward demurred from the next logical 
 step, the obvious conclusion was that a high incidence of lynching (not to mention 
 raping) was inevitable and attempts to reduce it unnatural. Perhaps more clearly 
 than any other issue, the rape argument illustrates the circular nature of  
 evolutionary thought in the area of race theory. How do we know that the black 
 man has rapist tendencies? Because he is inferior. How do we know that he 
 inferior? Because he has rapist tendencies. (452) 
 The paradoxicality and absurdity of this argument, analogized in John’s plight and 
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murder and suggested, darkly, in the death of Josie, returns us full-circle to Du Bois’s 
response to Stoddard in the 1929 debate. Here Stoddard and the entire enterprise of 
scientific racism receive Du Bois’s most finely tuned and truculent criticism, with a poise 
and rhetorical fury unmatched in his polemical writings.  
 . . . [The Nordic] Program is the subjection and rulership of the world for the 
 benefit of the Nordics. They have overrun the earth and brought not simply 
 modern civilization and technique, but with it exploitation, slavery and 
 degradation to the majority of men. They have broken down native family life, 
 desecrated homes of weaker peoples and spread their bastards over every corner 
 of land and sea. They have been responsible for more intermixture of races than  
 any other people, ancient or modern, and they have inflicted this miscegenation 
 on helpless, unwilling slaves by force, fraud and insult; and this is the folk that 
 today has the impudence to turn on the darker races when they demand a share of 
 civilization, and cry: “You shall not marry our daughters!”  
      The blunt, crude reply is: Who in hell asked to marry your daughters? If this 
 race problem must be reduced to a matter of sex, what we demand is the right to 
 protect the decency of our own daughters. (40) 
 Twenty-nine years after the publication of Souls, Du Bois once again finds 
himself mired in a battle of rhetorical maneuvering in which rationality is invoked to 
construct an agenda for social inequity and racialized hatred. In this way, double 
consciousness reflects, in practice, the multiplicity of modes—from the polemical to the 
scientific to the literary—in which he would engage in order to expose the 
unreasonableness of the scientifically-motivated racist doctrines of his time. As in “Of 
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the Coming of John,” racial antipathy becomes in public discourse the means by which 
the aspirations of the “new Negro” envisioned in the 1900 Paris Exposition might be 
quashed by violences rooted in a logic seemingly outside of logic itself. Between and 
across genres and medias, then, Du Bois deploys and inhabits double consciousness as a 
rhetorical strategy that responds performatively, at times even playfully, to the dire ethical 
and existential dilemma presented by discourses of scientific racism.  
 
 39 
 
 
 
Notes:
                                                 
i
 Du Bois, “Philadelphia,” 1.  
ii
 Du Bois presents several other notable philosophical terms in this work, including his 
notion of “the color line” and “the Veil.” As I see it, the former term does not bear 
substantially upon “double consciousness,” while the latter is an at-times implicit and at-
times explicit component of this theory. Therefore, I will not discuss “the color line,” and 
I will treat the “the Veil” as a component feature of “double consciousness.” 
iii
 A charitable reading would grant that Du Bois is engaging in rhetorical posturing in 
this passage. In several chapters of Souls, the sensation of double consciousness and the 
apprehension of the “veil” come about as revelations to his fictional and autobiographical 
characters. As my reading of “Of the Coming of John” will indicate, the fictional hero of 
the tale solemnly attains double consciousness and apprehends the thickness of the “Veil” 
for the first time as an adult. Whether or not John was “born with a veil,” that is, he 
notably does not become aware of the presence of this veil until he experiences racism as 
a young man outside of his home town. Therefore, double consciousness is a product of 
experience in the world, and particularly, experience within a racist world; it is not 
something one is “born with,” whether or not one is marked as a black subject at birth. 
On the basis of this and similar passages in “Of the Meaning of Progress,” I shall regard 
the notion of double consciousness as a socially constructed (i.e., non-innate) sense of 
perception that manifests, seemingly as in the form of a revelation, through the 
experience of racism. 
iv
 In Souls, Du Bois does not speak of the ways in which his theorization of double 
consciousness may impact members of the other “races” he identifies. That is, he is 
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concerned specifically with African American identity. Yet, it can be assumed that the 
process of historical change that may potentially shift the dilemma of “the Negro” may 
also be applied to the other races specified; or that these other races, in different (i.e., 
hypothetical) historical circumstances, may also have been afflicted with the same 
dilemma.  
v
 I use the masculine pronoun here merely to retain consistency with Du Bois’s language 
and his figure of the “seventh son.”  
vi
 In Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance, Houston Baker deploys a powerful 
conceptual matrix that may have been engendered by or derived from this particular 
dilemma. In Modernism, Baker elucidates the variously accommodationalist and 
revolutionary strategies adopted by Harlem Renaissance and “proto” / “para”-Harlem 
Renaissance writers such as Du Bois and Booker T. Washington. Baker’s first key term, 
“the mastery of form,” designates the process by which figures such as Washington and 
Charles Chestnut adopted in their writings rhetorics of “minstrelsy” to gain the favor of a 
white reading audience. Baker notes that Washington’s “adoption of tones and types” 
was a tactic designed “to keep his audience tuned in” (30); and that “these tones and 
types . . . are reassuring sounds from the black quarters. Although the narrator [of 
Washington’s autobiography] may be stunningly capable of standard English 
phraseology, crafty political analyses, and smooth verbal gymnastics . . . there can be no 
worry that the Negro is getting ‘out of hand.’ For at all proper turns, there are comforting 
sounds and figures of a minstrel theater that we know so well” (30-31). Thus, one may 
read the “pretence” and “hypocrisy” of figures such as Washington as both a symptom of 
double consciousness and as a decision to retreat “within the Veil.” The corollary term in 
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Baker’s conceptual lexicon is the “deformation of mastery,” exemplified by “radicals” 
such as Du Bois. Baker notes: “The deformation of mastery refuses a master’s nonsense. 
It returns—often transmuting ‘standard’ syllables—to the common sense of the tribe. Its 
relationship to masks is radically different from that of the mastery of form. The spirit 
house occupying the deformer is not minstrelsy, but the sound and space of an African 
ancestral past” (56). Thus, one may read the “revolt” and “radicialism” of figures such as 
Du Bois and Paul Lawrence Dunbar as symptoms of double consciousness and as 
decisions to tear down or “escape from” the same veil behind which figures such as 
Washington may have conducted a “hypocritical” retreat.  
vii
 Elsewhere, especially in The Crisis, Du Bois refers to the ways in which racism and 
white supremicism have negatively impacted those of “yellow” and other skin tones. 
However, in The Souls of Black Folk, where double consciousness is defined and 
deployed, Du Bois focuses specifically on the problem of anti-Black racism in the United 
States. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain if, according to Du Bois, double 
consciousness is a perceptual mode or ethical dilemma that may be inhabited by other 
non-whites living in the United States or elsewhere. Moreover, it is difficult to determine 
if double consciousness is possible for those with black skin living in prior historical 
periods or in other geographical locations, though one can assume that the dilemma Du 
Bois presents may also be applied to other anti-Black racist cultures, such as early 
twentieth century Europe.  
viii
 To be more precise: double consciousness may anticipate not only Fanon’s declaration 
of black existence as being mere “facticity” stripped of “transcendence” (Black Skin, 
109), but also key aspects of Sartrean existential philosophy to which Fanon is admittedly 
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indebted. In being rendered as mere object, Fanon describes in “The Fact of Blackness” 
the process whereby he is reduced to “facticity,” the very “fact of [his] blackness.” This 
presents an existential dilemma: for it is in and through this process of objectification that 
one loses access to the key “liberating” component of existential being, “transcendence.” 
At this juncture, it is important to define and locate Fanon’s use of these terms. First, 
“facticity” designates the myriad physical, social, psychological, and historical properties 
of an individual that one can ascertain through third-person observation; such “facts” may 
include observations regarding one’s bodily appearance, system of beliefs, intellectual 
abilities, historical experiences, and so on. While one’s facticity may, on some level, 
delineate the ways in which the world outside the individual chooses to perceive, define, 
and categorize that individual, one’s existence ought not, in existential terms, be limited 
to or defined strictly in relation to one’s factic attributes. The reason for this is that one’s 
being cannot be properly or wholly relegated to those aspects of one’s identity to which 
only the outside world, or the third-person observer, has access; this would deny that the 
individual possesses an irreducibly unique character, something that cannot be “pinned 
down” or known strictly in factic terms. This would also deny that the individual who 
possesses these attributes has a stance or attitude toward those terms. The position one 
takes towards one’s facticity is what is regarded as “transcendence,” defined by Taylor 
Carman as “the free, future-directed, first-person, conscious relation in which I stand to 
the world, including my own facticity. My facticity provides the setting and context of 
my transcendence, but my transcendence in turn determines what is important and salient 
for me in my facticity” (Carman, 236). In terms of racial identity, then, “transcendence” 
designates the process whereby a racialized subject may escape self-definition strictly in 
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terms of one’s brute facticity, or those somatic (and other) markings that the external 
world imposes upon non-white individuals.  
 In both Sartrean and Fanonian existentialism, one who “allows” oneself to be 
stripped of transcendence may be guilty of what Sartre refers to as “bad faith.” One 
partakes in bad faith when one permits oneself to make decisions and determinations by 
denying either or both one’s facticity or transcendence. In short, one who engages in bad 
faith may be said to engage in processes whereby one self-identifies and acts solely in 
terms of one’s capacity to transcend while denying one’s facticity (as in Sartre’s example 
of the “woman seduced”), or whereby one self-identifies and acts solely in terms of one’s 
facticity while denying one’s transcendence (as in Sartre’s example of the “garcon de 
café,” invoked by both Fanon and Ian Hacking in his seminal essay, “Making Up People” 
[1986]).
 
In other words, one engages in bad faith when participating in processes of self-
deception with regard to one’s factic attributes or one’s authentic attitude toward those 
attributes, or when one seeks intentionally to deceive others by denying or exaggerating 
aspects of either one’s facticity or transcendence.  
 In Black Skin, Fanon develops a theory of identity that posits skin color as an 
essential, and perhaps immutable, component of one’s ability to transcend facticity. This 
inability to transcend facticity, imposed upon the black individual from without, may 
preclude recognition and interrogation of bad faith. Like Du Bois, Fanon presents a 
model of racial identity based upon a perceptual mode—rooted also in optics—that 
creates, in turn, a profound ethical dilemma for the black-skinned individual. However, 
Fanon does not, in “The Fact of Blackness,” trace the precise ethical implications of this 
dilemma; unlike Du Bois, he does not describe the dilemma as necessarily producing a 
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subject who must choose between (for example) either “hypocrisy” or “radicalism.” The 
distinction at this level strikes me as trivial; overwhelmingly, both double consciousness 
and Fanonian existentialism posit the notion of bad faith as a potentially inescapable 
condition of existence for black-skinned individuals “overdetermined from without” 
(Fanon, 115) in a racist culture that would reduce them to brute facticity. In this way, the 
Sartrean notion of “bad faith” strikes me as being implicit within Du Bois’s model of 
double consciousness, despite the fact that Du Bois did not use this term and could not 
have considered himself, in 1903, an “existentialist” per se. See “The Fact of Blackness” 
in Black Skin and Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. 
ix
 Grant, 226.  
x
 All quoted passages in The Crisis taken from The Modernist Journals Project. The 
Crisis, Volume 8, No. 14. 1914, pg. 232-33. Web. 232. 
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 Ibid., 232. 
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 Du Bois, "Paris,” 575.  
xiii
 Crisis, 233.  
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 Ibid., 233.  
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 Ibid., 233. 
xvi
 Du Bois, "Paris,” 575. 
xvii
 In a section endnote in The Philadelphia Negro, Du Bois notes: “I shall throughout 
this study use the term ‘Negro,’ to designate all persons of Negro descent, although the 
appellation is to some extent illogical. I shall, moreover, capitalize the word, because I 
believe that eight million Americans are entitled to a capital letter” (x).   
xviii
 Du Bois, "Paris,” 575.  
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xix
 Ibid., 576.  
xx
 Ibid., 575.  
xxi
 Library of Congress. “African American Photographs Assembled for 1900 Paris 
Exposition.” Web. See http://www.loc.gov/pictures/collection/anedub/Du Bois.html  
xxii
 Du Bois, "Paris,” 576.  
xxiii
 The apparent discrepancy with figures in the earlier block quotation taken from the 
same paper may be explained thus: in the first instance, Du Bois was referring to the 
number of blacks in Georgia through 1890; in this instance, he’s referring to the 
“present” number.  
xxiv
 It should be noted that this data appears again in Du Bois’s Atlanta University studies 
in Dusk of Dawn.  
xxv
 Ibid., 577. 
xxvi
 According to remarks Du Bois makes in Souls, he clearly had strong European 
sympathies at this time. When he writes in Souls of “being a problem,” he notes, “being a 
problem is a strange experience,—peculiar even for one who has never been anything 
else, save perhaps in babyhood and in Europe” (9).  
xxvii
 Du Bois, Souls, 27.  
xxviii
 Interestingly, despite Du Bois’s vehement critique of Washington, he seems to have 
initially supported Washington’s Atlanta speech in a brief note written to him in 1895. 
An excerpt of the official note appended to the image on Library of Congress Website: 
“Although W.E.B. Du Bois would later publish a pointed challenge to Booker T. 
Washington’s philosophy in his Souls, at the time of Washington’s Atlanta speech, Du 
Bois wrote this letter to express his congratulations.” See “Du Bois Congratulates 
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Washington on Atlanta Speech”:  
http://myloc.gov/Exhibitions/naacp/prelude/ExhibitObjects/Du BoisCongratulates.aspx. 
xxix
 Note these stanzas of Coleridge’s poem (excerpted from Norton), which has in recent 
years received the attention of trauma theorists: 
  Farewell, farewell! but this I tell 
  To thee, thou Wedding-Guest! 
  He prayeth well, who loveth well 
  Both man and bird and beast. (610-13) 
  . . .  
  He went like one that hath been stunned, 
  And is of sense forlorn: 
  A sadder and a wiser man, 
  He rose the morrow morn. (622-25) 
xxx
 I do not mean to suggest that such arguments are no longer being made or that they no 
longer carry force in domains of public perception and public policy. An exhausting list 
of such work might be cited, though Richard Herrnstein’s The Bell Curve is one such 
study in a long and vexing trajectory demonstrating that discourses of scientific racism 
persist, in largely unmodified form, to the present day.  
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